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abstraCt
This article presents improvements in the Advanced Forensics Format Library version 3 that provide for 
digital signatures and other cryptographic protections for digital evidence, allowing an investigator to 
establish a reliable chain-of-custody for electronic evidence from the crime scene to the court room. No 
other system for handling and storing electronic evidence currently provides such capabilities. This article 
discusses implementation details, user level commands, and the AFFLIB programmer’s API. 
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introduCtion
Chain-of-custody for evidence from the crime 
scene to the court room is a bedrock principle 
of both civil and criminal law. Without a clear 
and unambiguous chain-of-custody there is no 
way to be sure that an object presented to the 
court is the same object that was collected at the 
scene of the crime. Even evidence presented to 
technical experts needs to have chain-of-cus-
tody: without it, there is no way to assure that 
the expert’s testimony pertains to evidence from 
the actual case that is under consideration.
A paper notebook found at a crime scene 
can be put into an evidence bag, tagged, and 
locked away in an evidence locker. Each time 
the evidence is accessed or moved to another 
location this fact will be noted. In this manner 
the prosecution can show that the evidence 
has not been tampered; in the rare cases where 
tampering takes place, it can be detected.
But unlike records written with pen and 
paper, digital files can be modified without leav-
ing a trace of the original message. This is one 
of the great challenges of digital forensics—es-
tablishing that a particular arrangement of bits 
on a digital storage medium is the result of on 
specific computational history (e.g., deleting a 
file) and not of another (e.g., using a hex editor 
to write raw sectors onto the disk drive that are 
indicative of a deleted file)[Carrier, 2006]. 
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Of course, hard drives, USB memory sticks, 
and cell phones are tagged and bagged. But at 
some point, the information on these devices 
needs to be copied onto another computer system 
for analysis. In a modern forensic laboratory 
these files might be placed on a high-capacity 
server or a Storage Area Network (SAN) to 
allow for flexible use and simultaneous access 
by multiple examiners. Such environments 
require highly reliable technical measures to 
provide assurances that evidence is kept intact 
and unmodified.
Although computer forensics practitioners 
understand the importance of chain-of-custody, 
today’s tools for preserving this chain are poor. 
Programs such as EnCase[Keightley, 2003] and 
dcfldd[Harbour, 2006] will compute an MD5 
or SHA-1 cryptographic hash of a disk when 
it is copied by an investigator into an image 
file. Later, when the image file is provided to a 
forensic analyst, the analyst can compare the 
hash of the image received with the hash of the 
original to determine if the file has been modi-
fied. If the hashes match, the assumption is that 
the file is unchanged from the original.
This article introduces an improved method 
for assuring the integrity of digital evidence 
that is based on public key cryptography. In 
addition to providing improved integrity, the 
method presented also allows for: 
• digital documentation of evidentiary trans-
fer from one agent to another; 
• reconstruction of evidence that has been 
inadvertently damaged during transfer; 
• forensically sound methods for recovering 
partial evidence in cases where so much 
digital evidence has been damaged that 
reconstruction is no longer possible; 
• encryption with both symmetric and public 
key cryptography, so that evidence that is 
acquired in a hostile environment can be 
safely transferred back to a secure facil-
ity. 
These new methods have been implement-
ed in the Advanced Forensic Format Library 
(AFFLIB) Version 3[Garfinkel, 2008]. AFFLIB 
is an open source software package written in 
the C/C++ programming language that allows 
for the imaging, manipulation, storage and use 
of digital evidence. The software is available 
free of charge for incorporation into both open 
source and proprietary forensic applications. 
baCkground and Prior 
Work
disks and disk images
Computer hard drives, optical drives, and 
solid state drives are mass storage devices that 
organize the information they store as a series 
of numbered, fix-sized sectors. Traditionally 
hard drives employ a sector size of 512 bytes 
and CDROM drives used 2048-byte sectors, 
although a standard for 4096-byte sectors is 
currently under development[Fonseca, 2007].
A disk image file, or more generally an im-
age file, is a file that contains a sector-for-sector 
copy of the contents of a mass storage device. 
Image files are intended to be perfect copies of 
the disk’s contents. Image files are produced 
with programs called imagers.2
Although the discussion to this point has 
focused on disk image files, in practice any data 
carrying device can be imaged. Once a device 
is imaged, the forensic investigator works with 
the image, rather than the original device, in 
order to preserve the device’s integrity: most 
computer forensic tools can directly read and 
process disk image files. 
Image files are particularly important when 
it is necessary to record the state of a device that 
must then be returned to service—for example, 
in the event of a network attack. In these cases, 
the image file may be the only tangible evidence 
of the crime that has taken place after the system 
has been restored to operation.
Imaging also provides a simple and oper-
ating system independent means for backing 
up a hard drive: the drive is simply imaged 
into a file or onto another drive. To restore the 
backup, the image is restored on the original 
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drive. The image can also be restored on an-
other drive of similar size, a process sometimes 
called cloning.
Disk image files can be stored in different 
formats. The most basic format is the raw for-
mat in which the bytes in the image file have a 
one-for-one correspondence to the bytes on the 
physical device (e.g., bytes 0–511 in the file rep-
resent the first 512-byte sector, bytes 512–1023 
represent the second 512-byte sector, and so 
on). The advantage of the raw format is that it 
is easy to understand and easy to implement; 
the disadvantage is that raw files consume as 
much storage space as the device being imaged: 
imaging a newly purchased 80GB hard drive 
will produce an 80GB raw file, even though 
each one of the drive’s 160 million 512-byte 
disk sectors is filled with ASCII NULLs.
disk image formats
There are two important shortcomings that 
forensic examiners experience when working 
with raw disk images: the images are unwieldy, 
and they do not capture important information 
such as the time that the disk was imaged, who 
performed the imaging, or even the device sector 
size. Because of these shortcomings, developers 
have created a number of disk image formats, 
each with its own intended purpose. 
One of the most widely used file formats 
today is the EnCase Evidence File Format. This 
format is based on the ASR Data Expert Wit-
ness Compression Format [ASR, 2002]. Disk 
images are stored as a series of files, each file 
not exceeding 2GB (2−1=2147483647 bytes). 
The first file contains a “Case Info” header, a 
table containing a 32-bit CRC and the offset 
of each “blocks” in the disk image (the default 
block size is 64 sectors), and a footer containing 
an MD5 hash for the entire physical disk. Also 
contained in the header are the date and time 
of acquisition, an examiner’s name, notes on 
the acquisition, and an optional password; the 
header concludes with its own CRC. Images 
that require more than 2GB of storage are split 
into multiple files and given file names such 
as FILE.E01, FILE.E02, etc. Disk images can 
be split into files smaller than 2GB for storage 
to archival CDROM. The EnCase/Expert Wit-
ness file format can be read by a number of 
commercial programs and by the Open Source 
Libewf[Kloet et  al., 2008]. 
Other forensic file formats include a 
proprietary format used by AccessData’s Fo-
rensic Toolkit (FTK), the file format used by 
Safeback[NTI Forensics  Source, 2008], and the 
file format used by ILook Investigator[US Trea-
sury, 2008]. A detailed survey of forensic file 
formats appears in [Garfinkel et  al., 2006].
In almost all cases it is faster to perform a 
forensic investigation with a an uncompressed 
raw file than it is to work with a compressed 
file. This is because modern forensic programs 
frequently need to skip from one part of a disk 
image to another: when a compressed format 
is used, parts of the disk image are constantly 
being read off the disk, decompressed, and 
then discarded. Using an uncompressed for-
mat avoids the decompression step, which is 
computationally intensive. 
assuring integrity with Hash 
functions
Forensic practitioners today largely rely on 
the MD5[Rivest, 1992] and SHA-1[Computer 
Systems  Laboratory and Technology, 1993] 
cryptographic hash functions to assure the 
integrity of images that they acquire.
A cryptographic hash is a one-way function 
which takes an arbitrary amount of input and 
produces an output of a fixed size. (Cryptogra-
phers will sometimes call the input a pre-image 
and refer to the hash value as the residue.) To 
be considered strong, a cryptographic hash 
function should have these properties: 
• Preimage resistance: Given any hash, it 
should be computationally infeasible to 
find a specific preimage that produces the 
residue. 
• Second preimage resistance: Given a 
message m311, it should be computation-
ally infeasible to find a message m2 that 
has the same hash. 
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• Collision resistance: It should be computa-
tionally infeasible to find any two messages 
m1 and m2 that have the same hash.[Friedl, 
2005, Boneh, 2001] 
The MD5 algorithm produces a 128-bit 
cryptographic hash; this hash is typically written 
as 32 hexadecimal digits. The SHA-1 algorithm 
produces a 160-bit hash which is typically writ-
ten as 40 digits. 
Today it is common practice for computer 
forensic investigators to record the MD5 or 
SHA-1 of a disk when it is imaged. The hash is 
computed by the acquisition tool as the data is 
read from disk being imaged and displayed on 
the computer’s screen; the investigator records 
this number in the investigative report. 
For example, in the case of US v. Zacarias 
Moussaoui, when the contents of Moussaoui’s 
laptop were duplicated by the FBI with Safe-
back, a program was used to compute the MD5 
of both the laptop’s drive and the copy made by 
the FBI. A copy of the laptop’s drive was then 
provided to Mr. Moussaoui’s defense team. The 
MD5 of this copy was computed and compared 
with the MD5 of the original laptop’s drive. 
According to court filings: 
 “The significance of this point is two-fold. 
First, there can be no question that the defense 
has the exact same copy of the original that the 
Government has, so they can conduct any further 
investigation on their copy that they wish. Sec-
ond, the results of the MD5 program as to these 
two laptops further demonstrate the reliability 
of the Safeback program.”[Novak, 2002] 
There are several advantages to the current 
practice of manually recording hash codes and 
incorporating them into investigative reports:
• The practice is easy to understand. 
• The practice is in general use. 
• The practice is easy to explain in court. 
• The hash codes are easily recorded in an 
investigative report which the investigator 
is presumably already keeping for other 
purposes. 
• The same procedures which assure for 
integrity of the investigative report will 
similarly assure for the integrity of the 
hash codes. 
But today’s practice has potential problems 
as well:
• Because the hash codes are recorded in 
what is essentially a free-format report 
narrative, it is difficult to apply automated 
processing and validation. 
• If the disk image becomes corrupted, the 
hash code will only report that it no longer 
matches: it does not allow the error to be 
isolated or corrected. 
Md5 Vulnerabilities
In recent years a number of vulnerabilities have 
been found in the MD5 hashing algorithm, cul-
minating with the discovery of MD5 collisions 
[Wang et  al., 2004]. For this reason MD5 is no 
longer considered by computer scientists to be 
a good choice for security-critical applications. 
Although as of this writing no SHA-1 collisions 
have been publicly announced, many research-
ers feel that it is only a matter of time [Schneier, 
2004]. Increasingly security software uses the 
SHA-256 algorithm, which produces a 256-bit 
hash, and NIST has started an effort to develop 
a new hash standard [NIST, 2007].
There are at least two reasons that the dis-
covery of MD5 collisions was not as catastrophic 
for computer security in practice as they might 
otherwise have been: 
• First, although it is possible to generate 
MD5 collisions, it still takes a considerable 
amount of computer power and expertise 
to do so. 
• A second and perhaps more important 
reason is that modern security engineering 
practice is to use a plug-in architecture for 
cryptographic algorithms. To be “plug-
gable” formats must store version numbers, 
algorithm names and key lengths in data 
that transmitted or stored. The practical 
result of this engineering practice is that 
most programs that employ hash functions 
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can work with a wide range of algorithm. 
Software that relies on cryptographic 
hashes can then validate using any or all of 
these algorithms, dramatically reducing the 
chances that an attack will be successful. 
Piecewise Hashing
In addition to computing a hash of the entire 
disk image, some tools will compute a hash 
for individual sections or “pieces” of the im-
age. For example, dcfldd [Harbour, 2006] 
can compute a hash for each block and store 
the hashes in a separate file. This approach of 
separately hashing each piece of the file is called 
piecewise hashing. 
Piecewise hashing is an important advance 
for digital forensics. Whereas a single hash code 
for an image can establish that an image has not 
been modified, if the file is modified the piece-
wise hashes can be used to help determine the 
location and extent of the alternation. Changing 
a single bit from a 0 to a 1 will change the hash 
for the entire image, but it will only change one 
of the piecewise hashes. In such a case, the 
remaining pieces would still have evidentiary 
value. Even if a file is truncated—for example, 
an 80GB file cut into a 20GB file—the piecewise 
hashes will allow the remaining evidence to be 
used, as long as it is otherwise unaltered.
digital signatures for data 
integrity
Digital signatures were invented by Diffie 
and Hellman for the purpose of securing 
mail sent over digital networks such as the 
Internet[Diffie and Hellman, 1976]. Digital 
signatures in the form of digital certificates 
have been applied for the purpose of certifying 
cryptographic keys[Kohnfelder, 1978], and now 
provide authentication for the vast majority 
of encrypted communications on the Internet 
through their incorporation into the SSL and 
TLS protocols[Dierks and Allen, 1999]. Digital 
signatures have also been widely applied to 
code signing in the Windows and Macintosh 
operating systems, as well as signing Linux 
software updates. But prior to the work pre-
sented in this article, digital signatures have 
not been applied to imaging of digital media 
for forensic purposes.
Modern digital signatures are implemented 
as functional compositions of cryptographic 
hash functions and public key cryptography. 
In practice a document that is to be signed is 
hashed with a function such as SHA-1. The 
hash is then encrypted using an asymmetric 
encryption algorithm such as RSA[Rivest et 
al., 1977].
Asymmetric encryption algorithms have 
the property that data encrypted with an en-
cryption key can only be decrypted with a 
matching decryption key. In practice one key 
is kept confidential (the private key) while the 
other key is disclosed (the public key). When 
used for digital signatures, the private key is 
used to sign the signature while the public key 
is used to validate to signature.
Verifying a digital signature accomplishes 
two purposes: it verifies that the digital docu-
ment has not been modified, and it verifies that 
a particular private key was used to create the 
signature. Verification is typically performed 
in three steps. First, the document’s hash func-
tion is computed for a second time. Next, the 
signature is decrypted with the signer’s public 
key. Finally, the computed hash is compared 
with the decrypted hash: if they match, the 
signature verifies.
Hash functions alone are not 
digital signatures
It is important for forensic practitioners to 
understand that what gives the digital signa-
ture its security is the use of a private key to 
mathematically sign the cryptographic hash: 
a cryptographic hash by itself is not a digital 
signature.
This is an important distinction, because the 
terms “digital signature” and “forensic signa-
ture” are frequently—and incorrectly—used by 
forensics practitioners in reference to a simple 
cryptographic hash (see [Haggerty and Taylor, 
2007, ICS, 2008]). A hash value by itself is not 
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a signature, because it is not based on any secret 
information: anyone in possession of the data 
can generate the hash; thus, having the hash is 
not proof that a specific person or system had 
posession of the data. 
True digital signatures are important for 
establishing chain-of-custody because of their 
non-repudiability properties. If the signer’s 
private key has not been compromised and if 
the signature is valid, then the private key was 
used to create the signature3. One can easily 
imagine a future in which digital evidence is 
routinely signed using trusted hardware such 
as a US Department of Defense Common Ac-
cess Card[US Department of Defense, 2008]. 
Such a signature provides not such an assurance 
that the evidence has not been tampered—it 
provides an electronic proof that a specific 
person (or, at least, a specific CAC) was used 
to sign the evidence when it was acquired. 
Other information such as GPS coordinates or 
a secure timestamp[Adams et  al., 2001] could 
be included in the signature as well. 
aff and afflib 3
The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) is a 
format for storing digital evidence and associ-
ated metadata. Similar to the Expert Witness 
Format, AFF stores digital information as a 
series of blocks, range in size from 512 bytes 
to 4GB, which can be optionally compressed 
and stored in one or more disk files. Unlike 
Expert Witness, AFF is an extensible format 
which can store any kind of arbitrary data or 
metadata. To this end, AFF can be thought of 
as two parts: a container file format, similar to 
the ZIP file format, and a schema for mapping 
digital evidence to specific name/value pairs. 
A detailed description of the disk representa-
tion for the AFF format has been previously 
published[Garfinkel et  al., 2006].
AFFLIBTM is an implementation of AFF 
written in a portable C++ that can be called 
from either C or C++. Rather than forcing 
the programmer to understand segments, data 
segments, compression and so on, AFFLIB 
implements a simple abstraction that makes 
the AFF image file appear as two resources: a 
simple name/value database that can be accessed 
with traditional put and get semantics; and a 
stream that can be accessed using af_open(), 
af_read(), and af_seek() function calls. 
If af_open() is used to open a non-AFF file, 
the library defaults to a pass-through mode of 
operation, allowing AFF-aware programs to 
work equally well with raw files. In this manner, 
it is easy to modify existing forensics software 
to work with AFF yet retain compatibility with 
raw files.
aff design
Specific goals for AFF are presented in [Gar-
finkel et  al., 2006] and repeated in Figure 1 . 
AFF accomplishes these goals by partitioning 
the format into two layers: a data storage layer, 
which specifies how the named AFF segments 
are stored in an actual file, and a data schema 
layer, which defines how the information stored 
in the named segments is to be interpreted. 
aff data storage layer
The AFF data storage layer stores any number 
of name/value pairs within a single AFF object. 
AFF calls these name/value pairs segments. 
The segment name consists of a Unicode 
string between 1 and 64 characters long; the 
value consists of a 32-bit unsigned integer 
and a sequence of between 0 and 2−1 bytes. 
As discussed below in Section 3.3 , different 
names are used to store different kinds of data 
and metadata.
When AFF is used to store disk images, 
the pagesize segment stores the size of each 
section of the disk image, the name page0 is 
used to store the first section, page1 is used 
to store the second, and so on. As the name 
implies, these sections of the disk image are 
called pages. By default AFF uses pages that 
are 16MB (2) bytes in length, although this 
can be changed on a file-by-file basis when the 
image file is created.
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AFFLIB Version 3 was released in the fall 
of 2007 and has been steadily improved since. 
AFFLIB 3 includes supports for five different 
data storage layers: 
• AFF: A disk image in a single file. The 
AFF file format stores AFF segments in a 
single file that consists of a file header, one 
or more AFF segments, and a file footer. The 
format is designed to allow easy parsing 
and validation of AFF files and easy data 
recovery in the event of media failure. 
Unlike the Expert Witness format, the AFF 
format store an entire disk image and associated 
metadata in a single file. This is designed to aid 
processing and ease-of-use in environments that 
work with dozens or even thousands of drives 
simultaneously. As a result, we could not use 
an existing archive format such as ZIP or JAR 
because neither supported files larger than 4GB 
due to the use of 32-bit offsets within the file 
directory. Likewise, we couldn’t use compressed 
tar files because they do not provide for random 
access. In retrospect we could have used the 
ZIP64 format, but at the time we did not have 
an implementation of ZIP64 that was both clean 
and Open Source. 
When an application asks AFFLIB to open 
an AFF file with the af_open() call, AFFLIB 
scans the entire file, noting the offset of each 
segment, and builds an in-memory table of 
contents with this information. Offsets stored 
within each segment allows the file to be read 
quickly, without necessitating the reading of 
each byte in the file. Although it would be pos-
sible to store the table of contents at the end of 
the file, the way the ZIP file format does, we 
decided to force a trip through the segment head-
ers within the file as a way of quickly verifying 
the file’s integrity. Offsets stored within the file 
allow reading only the segment headers, rather 
than forcing a read of the entire file contents. 
In practice this process takes between 10 and 
30 seconds on a modern desktop system for 
image files of devices ranging from 10GB to 
200GB. Modern operating systems cache disk 
sectors, so once a file is opened, subsequent 
file openings are nearly instantaneous as long 
as these sectors remain in the host operating 
system’s cache. 
• AFD: Multiple AFF files in a single di-
rectory. Despite the fact that the AFF file 
format supports files larger than 4GB, some 
file systems (e.g., MSDOS) do not support 
files larger than 2GB. On these systems 
AFFLIB supports an alternative storage 
mode called AFD, in which multiple AFF 
files are stored in a single directory. When 
a directory ending in the extension .afd 
is passed to AFFLIB’s af_open() routine, 
Figure 1. AFF Design Goals, from [Garfinkel et  al., 2006]
• Ability to store: 
• disk images with or without compression. 
• disk images of any size. 
• metadata within disk images or separately. 
• images in a single file of any size or split among multiple files. 
• Arbitrary metadata in the form of user-defined name/value pairs. 
• Extensibility. 
• Simple design. 
• Multi-platform, open source implementation. 
• Freedom from any intellectual property restrictions. 
• Provisions for internal self-consistency checking, so that part of an image could be recovered 
even if other parts of the image were rendered corrupt or otherwise lost. 
• Provisions for certifying the authenticity of evidence files both with traditional hash functions 
like MD5 and SHA-1 and with advanced digital signatures based on X.509(v)3 certificates. 
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AFFLIB scans the directory for .aff files 
and builds a single table of contents for 
all of the files. The maximum size of each 
AFF file within the AFD directory can be 
specified as an option. 
• AFM: Raw files with AFF annotations. A 
single AFF file can be used to store metadata 
or other annotations (for example, digital 
signatures) for a disk image that is stored 
in one or more raw files. In this case the 
file is given an AFM extension.
 For example, if a disk image is stored 
in three files, file.000, file.001 and 
file.002, annotations can be stored in a 
file called file.afm. Opening the file.
afm file with AFFLIB causes the library 
to automatically locate and reference the 
data in the raw files when the forensic ap-
plication attempts to read file data. 
• RAW and Split-Raw: Support for raw 
files. The AFFLIB library can also directly 
open raw or split-raw files if their file names 
are passed to the af_open() call. 
• S3: Storing on Amazon’s Simple Storage 
Service. For supporting grid computing 
applications using Amazon’s EC2, AF-
FLIB has the ability to directly store disk 
images inside Amazon’s Simple Storage 
Service[Amazon, 2008].
• Libewf: Legacy support for EnCase. 
Finally, LIBAFF can directly read disk 
images created in the Guidance Software 
EnCase file format using libewf[Kloet et 
al., 2008]. 
The AFFLIB af_open() determines which 
storage layer implementation to use based on the 
string pathname argument that it is provided. 
For example, an attempt to open or create a file 
which has an extension of .aff results in an AFF 
file being opened or created; opening a directory 
with a .afd extension results in the directory 
being treated as a collection of AFF files; calling 
af_open() with a path that has an an extension 
of .afd and the O_CREAT flag results in a direc-
tory being created. S3 files are specified with 
a URI in the form s3://bucketname/prefix. 
Split-raw files are automatically detected when 
a file is opened with a .000 extension and a file 
is present with the same basename and a .001 
extension. EnCase files are specified with the 
standard .E01 extension.
aff schema
The AFF schema defines specific segment 
names, their purposes, and the interpretation of 
the 32-bit flag and variable-length data areas. A 
list of the segments that have been defined as 
of AFFLIB v3.0.6 appears in Table 1 . Because 
of the open nature of AFF, applications are able 
to create their own named segment and store 
that information in the AFF file.
Some of the more important AFF segments 
appear in Table 1 .
Additional segment types used for integ-
rity and privacy will be discussed later in this 
article.
afflib streams layer
In order to facilitate the integration of AFF into 
existing and new forensic software, AFFLIB 
implements a streams layer which provides 
a standard POSIX-like streams abstraction 
through a standard set of interfaces (Table 2). 
transparent integration with 
afuse
Although support for AFF is relatively easy to 
add to an existing program by replacing calls 
to open(), read() and with seek() with 
af_open(), af_read(), and af_seek(), oc-
casionally it is not possible or desired to make 
source code modification to forensic tools.
To accommodate these problems AFFLIB 
includes a user-level program called affuse. 
Implemented on top of the Filesystem in Us-
espace (FUSE)[Szeredi, 2008], affuse allows 
a compressed AFF file to appear as a raw file 
in the computer’s own file system. FUSE takes 
care of automatically decompressing pages as 
necessary and caching the uncompressed pages 
with all available memory.
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Device Characteristics:
pagesize The size of each AFF page, in bytes
imagesize The number of bytes in the image
sectorsize The size of each sector, in bytes
devicesectors The number of sectors on the device.
Metadata:
case_num Case number; for compatibility with EnCase.
image_gid A randomly generated 128-bit number used to uniquely identify each acquired image.
Image characteristics:
pagesize Size (in bytes) of each uncompressed AFF data 
page is stored in segment “flag” field.
parity0 The parity page; an XOR of all existing pages
imaging_commandline The complete command used to create the image.
imaging_date The date and time when the imaging was started.
imaging_notes Notes made by the forensic examiner when the imaging was started.
imaging_device The device that was used as the source of the im-age.
blanksectors The number of sectors that are completely blank
AFF segments that are repeated for each page %d:
page%d
The named sector for each page of the disk image; 
%d is replaced with the page number, from 0 to 
devicesectors¸ pagesizesectors.
page%d_md5 The segment for the MD5 hash of the page
page%d_sha1 The segment for the SHA-1 hash of the page
page%d_sha256 The segment for the SHA256 hash of the page
Bad Sector Management:
badsectors The number of sectors in the image which could not be read due to a hardware failure
Table 1. Some of the segment names used in the AFFLIB 3 schema
AFFLIB POSIX-like functions
af_open Opens an AFF/AFD/AFM/Encase/S3/raw/split 
raw file
af_reopen Opens an existing file handle for reading or writ-ing using the AFFLIB system
af_popen Opens a process for reading or writing using the AFFLIB system
af_read Read bytes from the file
Table 2. The AFF streams layer
continued on following page
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For example, if the user has an AFF file 
called evidence.aff, this can be made to ap-
pear as a raw file in the same file system with 
these commands:
# ls -l evidence.aff
-rw-r--r-- 1 simsong 555   409039930 
Mar 23  2006 evidence.aff
# affuse evidence.aff evidenceraw
# ls -ld evidence*
-rw-r--r-- 1 simsong  555  409039930 
Mar 23  2006 evidence.aff
drwxr-xr-x 2 root    root          0 
Dec 31  1969 evidence.raw
# ls -l evidence.raw
total 0
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 2111864832 Dec 
31  1969 evidence.aff.raw
Notice that the current FUSE implementa-
tion reports that the raw file occupies 0 blocks 
and has a time stamp of the Unix Epoc. A future 
version of affuse will make all of the named 
segments inside the AFF file visible in their 
own named files.
With affuse, any Linux forensics tool 
can access not only AFF files, but also EnCase 
files and files stored on S3. Windows can be 
run on the same workstation using VMWare 
Player[VMWare, 2008]. VMWare Player can 
be configured to allow the Windows operating 
system (and therefore Windows applications) 
to view the host computer’s file system; with 
affuse, that file system can include the contents 
of an AFF evidence file. 
afflib 3 integrity 
features
AFFLIB 3 includes four important mechanisms 
for assuring the integrity. 
1. Picewise hashing of image pages 
2. Digital signatures of pages and all meta-
data 
3. Parity pages 
4. Chain-of-custody segments 
Table 2. continued
af_seek Seek to a different position in the disk image file
af_tell Reports the current position in the disk image file
af_eof Reports if the file pointer is at the end of the file
af_write
Write bytes to the file (used when imaging, not 
when performing forensic analysis)
af_close Closes an AFF file
Nonstandard extensions:
af_is_badsec-
tor Reports if the specified sector is bad
af_set_error_
reporter
Establishes a callback function for alerting the op-
erator that is called when AFF encounters an error
af_set_cache-
size Sets the size of the AFF page cache
af_vstat Returns status information about the AFF imple-
mentation and the opened file
af_stats Returns statistics about an AFF file
af_set_option Sets an implementation option
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The extensible design of the AFF storage 
system, allowed each of these features to be add-
ed to the original AFF specification[Garfinkel et 
al., 2006] without the need to make changes to 
the underlying AFF Data Storage Layer. 
Piecewise Hashing of data Pages
AFF files store image data in special “page” 
segments which are typically 16MB in size. 
As each page segment is written, AFFLIB 
can automatically compute the page’s MD5, 
SHA-1, and/or SHA256 hash and write an 
associated segment containing the hash value. 
The name of the hash page is simply the page 
name followed by the string _md5, _sha1 
or _sha256. Each hash may be individually 
enabled or disabled at runtime. For example, 
when SHA-1 piecewise hashing is enabled and 
the page page3 is written, AFFLIB computes 
that page’s SHA-1 and writes it into a segment 
named page3_sha1.
These piecewise hashes are used as a data 
integrity checks, similar to the way that the 
Expert Witness/EnCase format uses a CRC32. 
Even the MD5 is dramatically more secure than 
the CRC32. Nevertheless, these hashes are not 
intended to provide cryptographic protection 
for evidence: for that purpose AFF uses digital 
signatures, described below.
digital signatures
Digital signatures represent a significant im-
provement for evidence integrity over today’s 
standard practice of recording the MD5 or 
SHA-1 of an imaged disk in an investigator’s 
notebook: 
• Unlike a hash code written into an 
investigator’s report, digital signatures 
are mathematical structures created for 
the purpose of assuring the integrity of 
data: their suitability for this purpose have 
been considered for decades and is widely 
understood. 
• By using standard digital signatures, it 
is possible to integrate digital electronic 
evidence with existing software that al-
ready understands how to process digital 
certificates. 
• Unlike a hash code, which simply protects 
the image data, AFF digital signatures 
protect the entire disk image, and all of 
the associated metadata. 
• The private key used to sign the signature 
can be tied to a specific device or investiga-
tor, allowing the signature to be used for 
non-reputability in addition to integrity. 
• But the most important reason is that the 
use of digital signatures will permit the 
migration to imaging based on trusted 
hardware which can then help to assure 
the chain-of-custody of evidence from the 
system being imaged to the courtroom. 
AFF computes digital signatures for both 
metadata and data. When computing signatures 
on metadata, the segment name, 32-bit argu-
ment, and metadata value is signed. In the case 
of digital signatures computed on image data 
(“pages”), the signatures are calculated on the 
uncompressed data. As a result, it is possible to 
acquire and digitally sign a disk image and then 
later compress the image without compromising 
the integrity of the digital signatures. Calculat-
ing the signature on the uncompressed data 
further assures that the compression algorithm 
does not modify the data between compression 
and decompression: if the data were modified, 
the signature would not validate.
AFFLIB uses OpenSSL to generate and 
verify all digital signatures; signatures are 
stored in PKCS#7[Laboratories, 1993] format. 
Signatures that are stored directly in segments 
are stored as raw PKCS #7 objects, while 
signatures stored inside or adjacent to XML 
blocks are stored as Base64-encoded PKCS 
#7 objects.
AFF digital signatures complement the 
existing AFF integrity measures. Because the 
signature is stored in its own metadata segment, 
the signature does not change the content of 
the acquired disk image. And because AFM 
files can be used to annotate raw images, 
AFF signatures can be applied to raw image 
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files without modifying the data itself. This 
is similar to PGP’s ability to create “detached 
signatures,”[Zimmermann, 1995] although it 
is more powerful because PGP’s facility can 
only detect that an alteration has taken place, 
whereas AFF’s signature facility can report 
which page has been modified.
Notice that AFF signatures are independent 
of the underlying storage system. The signa-
tures can be stored in one file and the data in 
another file (as in an AFM file), or in multiple 
AFF files (as in an AFD directory). They can 
even be stored in the S3 network-based object 
storage system.
Signing AFF Segments
AFFLIB 3 allows each AFF segment to be 
individually signed. The signatures for these 
segments are stored in their own segments which 
are included as part of the AFF file. 
The data in an AFF segment consists of 
three parts: the segment name, the 32-bit flag, 
and the segment bytestream. Because the name 
and the flag determine how the contents of the 
bytestream are interpreted, all three must be 
included in the computation of the signature. 
AFFLIB 3 actually supports two signature 
modes, both of which include these three data 
elements. Both sign a hash of the segment data; 
the difference is how the hash is computed:
 
Signature Mode 0. The hash is computed 
from the segment name, a NULL byte, the seg-
ment argument (as a 32-bit number in network 
byte order), and the segment data. 
Signature Mode 1. This mode is reserved 
for AFF data pages. The signature is computed 
by calculating the hash of the segment name, 
five NULL bytes, and the uncompressed page 
data.4 In this manner, the signature is computed 
over the original data, rather than data that has 
been compressed or otherwise processed. 
As indicated above, the signatures are writ-
ten into segments themselves, with the segment 
name being name/sha256 where name is the 
original segment name sha256 is the hash 
algorithm used for computing the signature. 
This format allows easy migration to signatures 
based on SHA512, should the need arise, or 
NIST’s future signature algorithm. Indeed, 
the AFF signature format allows a single AFF 
file to be simultaneously signed with multiple 
schemes.
The observant reader will note that since 
AFF signatures are themselves stored in seg-
ments, it is possible that signatures themselves 
can be signed. While this is certainly a true 
observation, it is not a useful one, since the 
integrity of a signature is assured when the 
signature is validated. 
Signing AFF Files with X.509 
Certificates
Signatures can be written with either self-
signed certificates or with X.509[ITU, 2005] 
certificates that are issued as part of an 
organization’s PKI. AFFLIB 3 uses the plug-
gable “EVP” signature support in the OpenSSL 
library[OpenSSL, 2008] to compute signatures; 
this library includes full support for both RSA 
and DSA X.509 certificates with 1024, 2048 
or larger keys.
The easiest way to get a private key and 
a corresponding X.509 certificate is to make 
a self-signed certificate using the openssl 
command:
$ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 
-keyout sign.key -out sign.key 
-nodes




writing new private key to ‘sign.
key’
-----
You are about to be asked to enter 
information that will be
incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is 
called a Distinguished Name or
a DN.
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There are quite a few fields but you 
can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a de-
fault value,
If you enter ‘.’, the field will be 
left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:
US
State or Province Name (full name) 
[Some-State]:California
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Mon-
terey
Organization Name (eg, company) [In-
ternet Widgits Pty Ltd]:Naval
Postgraduate School
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) 
[]:Department of Computer
Science




When this command is run the user is 
asked a number of questions; OpenSSL uses 
the responses to these questions to build the 
CN field of the X.509 signing certificate and 
certificate request. 
The contents of the certificate can be viewed 
with the openssl x509 -text command, as 
shown in Figure 2 .
Certification of X.509 Certificates
As an alternative to creating a self-signed 
certificate, the practitioner can can create an 
RSA private/public key pair, create a certificate 
request (CSR), send the CSR to a certificate au-
thority, and use the certificate that the authority 
returns. This procedure is the same procedure 
that the practitioner would use to obtain an 
X.509 key for email or running a secure web 
server[Housley and Polk, 2001, Adams and 
Lloyd, 2002]. 
Security for X.509 Private Keys
The openssl command presented in Sec-
tion 4.2.2 places both the RSA private key, the 
public key, and the self-signed certificate into 
the same file. If the private key is stored without 
encryption, then the key file must be protected 
if non-repudiation is to be assured. Typically 
the contents of this file will be protected with 
the computer’s operating system using the 
same mechanisms that are used to protect the 
computer’s device drivers, operating system, 
and the afflib tools themselves: if these tools are 
secure, then so is the file containing the private 
key, and if these tools can be compromised, 
putting a passphrase on the private key adds 
little additional protection.
In some situations it is advantageous to 
have the private key stored separately from 
the operating system—for example, in a cryp-
tographic device such as a smart card (e.g., 
the Department of Defense Common Access 
Card[US Department of Defense, 2008]) or a 
USB token. Although OpenSSL has support for 
these devices, we have not implemented this 
functionality at the AFFLIB level due to our 
limited development resources. A future version 
of AFFLIB can support this functionality if it 
is required by AFF users.
bill of Materials and 
Chain-of-Custody
AFFLIB 3 introduces a special XML structure 
that contains a list of every AFF segment in 
the file, a signature for each segment, a set 
of “notes,” and a public key. This structure is 
called an “AFF Bill Of Materials” (AFFBOM). 
An example of the XML structure appears in 
Figure 3 .
When an AFF image is created with aim-
age, afconvert, copied with afcopy, or 
signed with afsign, an AFFBOM is created 
and signed with the private key belonging to the 
person who did the acquisition. This is stored 
in a special segment called affbom0.
Of course an individual AFFBOM segment 
can be removed from an AFF file; indeed, all of 
the signatures can be removed as well. This is 
not a shortcoming specific to the AFF signature 
scheme: any digital signature scheme suffers 
from the shortcoming that signatures can be 
stripped and the content can be changed by 
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$ openssl x509 -text -in sign.key -noout
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            a3:e1:ef:44:63:04:74:00
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Monterey, O=Naval Postgraduate 
School, 
            OU=Department of Computer Science, 
            CN=Simson L. Garfinkel/emailAddress=slgarfin@nps.edu
        Validity
            Not Before: May 17 01:40:13 2008 GMT
            Not After : Jun 16 01:40:13 2008 GMT
        Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Monterey, O=Naval Postgraduate 
School,
            OU=Department of Computer Science, 
            CN=Simson L. Garfinkel/emailAddress=slgarfin@nps.edu
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
            RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
                Modulus (1024 bit):
                    00:be:4e:10:cc:e4:ae:76:c2:d1:7c:72:c7:74:32:
                    f3:43:04:51:ed:ba:ed:a4:26:4d:46:b8:98:6c:bc:
                    28:10:13:7c:7d:20:a7:69:c7:9d:f1:66:4c:d3:b1:
                    12:48:fc:07:2d:87:83:f3:e4:0c:c8:64:b2:38:6a:
                    4a:18:39:bf:3f:08:ba:37:e1:69:3f:57:0c:06:8a:
                    c6:95:9d:f5:4a:62:fd:4d:04:49:f1:f7:23:b0:e3:
                    e4:ad:41:a1:4a:64:78:d2:fb:16:3d:22:2f:e1:59:
                    0d:47:07:85:1a:e7:aa:fa:3b:61:fe:0f:56:21:48:
                    c3:e1:49:c5:ad:32:08:4d:57
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
                AE:A6:63:40:52:BF:08:1D:E1:D3:A5:85:75:16:D8:BD:76:71:1E:BB
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 
                keyid:AE:A6:63:40:52:BF:08:1D:E1:D3:A5:85:75:16:D8:BD:76:71:1E:
BB
                DirName:/C=US/ST=California/L=Monterey/O=Naval
             Postgraduate School/OU=Department of Computer Science/CN=Simson
             L. Garfinkel/emailAddress=slgarfin@nps.edu
                serial:A3:E1:EF:44:63:04:74:00
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: 
                CA:TRUE
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        34:6d:22:50:28:72:3b:e5:4d:fd:99:3f:79:6a:37:e0:75:45:
        fb:df:a5:c8:29:a5:4d:62:3f:58:8a:a6:1a:48:86:83:c7:03:
        d7:59:84:b9:5:67:2b:2b:7a:8a:13:72:ec:82:d0:9a:56:b3:
        fd:a5:8a:7f:c1:68:6a:db:ea:d2:1f:41:b9:ab:23:16:f1:59:
        ca:91:3d:cb:fc:58:08:01:ab:4b:7b:15:c5:c5:7a:fc:a9:e8:
        ea:09:fc:8d:4f:1b:68:a7:e5:34:19:9d:ed:73:46:e5:95:87:
        3e:e2:65:58:0f:a2:66:d3:a5:6f:62:47:78:e8:65:34:30:b4:
        49:9d
Figure 2. The OpenSSL command can be used to decode the contents of a certificate
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an adversary. Signatures can be stripped from 
signed code, producing code that is unsigned. 
Signatures can be removed from S/MIME 
signed email messages, producing conventional, 
unsigned email message. There is, in principle, 
no way to tell the difference between an object 
that has had its signature removed from one that 
was never signed in the first place. The only way 
to know that a signature has been removed is 
through the use of policy—for example, a proto-
col that prohibits an organization from releasing 
an unsigned data object. But even then, there is 
no way to tell the difference between a genuine 
data object that was released and later had its 
signature stripped, and a fraudulent data object 
that was never signed in the first place. 
AFF Bill of Materials
When an AFF file is created or copied, an AFF 
Bill of Materials can be added. This block is 
an XML data structure that includes the date 
that it was signed, the certificate used to create 
the signature, notes, and an array of elements 
that represent each segment in the AFF file. An 
example of the schema appears in Figure 3 
The segment is called a bill of materials 
because it is literally a parts list of all the seg-
ments that make up the specific AFF file. Since 
AFF files are segmented and segments can be 
added or removed at will, the need exists for 
a single structure that lists all of the segments 
that need to be present for a file to be complete. 
Without the AFFBOM segments could be added, 
removed, or changed without detection.
The AFFBOM contains XML elements 
for the date that the signature was created, the 
program that created the signature, human-
readable notes, and an XML array containing a 
cryptographic hash of each AFF segment in the 
AFF file. Hashes can be computed in mode 0 or 
mode 1, as discussed in Section 4.2.1 . At the 
<affbom version=”1”>
<! –Date XML was written:–>
<date type=”ISO 01”>19980708T13:33:11</date>







Human-readable notes from the examiner
</notes>
<! –What follows is an array of elements, one for each AFF segment.–>
<affsegments>
<segmenthash segname=’myname1’ mode=’0’ alg=’sha256’>
base64 encoding of the hash of the named segment
</segmenthash>






Figure 3. The AFF Bill of Materials (AFFBOM) with signature at end.
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end of the XML structure is stored a Base64-
encoded digital signature of the structure.
What makes it possible to detect change is 
not just the fact that there is an AFFBOM, but 
the fact that it is digitally signed. Provided that 
the private key is guarded and that the signature 
process is trusted, a relying party can be assured 
that the specific set of segments with the specific 
hashes existed in the AFF file at the time the 
signature was created.
The XML block is signed using the OpenS-
SL signature routines; the resulting signature 
is placed at the end of the XML block as a 
base-64 coded PKCS #7 object. Although the 
W3C XML-Signature Recommendation[Bartel 
et  al., 2002] might have been a better choice, 
we were unable to find a suitable implementa-
tion, and the complexity of the specification is 
such that we did not wish to attempt writing it 
ourself. (The W3C reference implementation 
contains more than 130 C source files and 
requires two additional open source packages 
for proper operation.) Our implementation has 
the advantage of being small, easy to validate, 
and implemented. It would not be difficult to 
migrate to XML-Signature if such functionality 
is required, however.
Providing a Chain of Custody
Each time a signed AFF file is copied with af-
copy, a new AFFBOM can be created which 
includes a new AFFBOM that covers all of the 
original segments and all of the previous AF-
FBOMs. In this manner the sequence of signed 
bill-of-materials becomes a custody chain, 
showing who has copied the image and veri-
fying that no evidentuary segments have been 
added, deleted, or modified. These AFFBOMs 
are stored in segments named affbom1, af-
fbom2, etc., where the number is incremented 
for each copy generation.
The AFFLIB source code contains a dem-
onstration script called test_signing.sh that 
creates an evidence file and three X.509 certifi-
cates: one for Mr. Agent, one for Ms. Analyst, 
and one for Dr. Librarian, all officials in the 
fictional town of Remote, CA. The evidence 
file rawevidence.iso is converted into a file 
evidence.aff with afconvert and then 
signed with afsign using this command:
$ afsign -s agent.pem evidence.aff
The signature can be verified using the 
afverify command: 
$ afverify evidence.aff
Notice that the afverify command does 
not need the user to specify a certificate to use 
for verification, because the signing certificate 
is embedded in the evidence.aff file. When 
the program runs it displays the certificate that 
was used for verification, so that the investigator 
can verify that the file is still signed with the 
correct certificate.
Mr. Agent transfers the evidence to Ms. 
Analyst. This is done with the afcopy com-
mand:
$ afcopy -n -s analyst.pem evidence.
aff evidence2.aff
Enter notes. Terminate input with a 
‘.’ on a line by itself:
This copy was made by the analyst.
.
Thank you.
Copying evidence.aff --> evidence2.
aff
evidence2.aff: 20017252 bytes trans-
fered in 10.07 seconds. xfer rate: 
1.99 MBytes/sec
Notice that the file is automatically signed 
because a public/private keypair is provided in 
the file analyst.pem. The -n option tells af-
copy to take a note from standard input.
Of course, an AFF file can still be copied 
without using the afcopy command. In this case 
the file will be copied without a new XMLBOM 
segment being added. 
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Verification
Verification is done with the AFFLIB program 
afverify. This program opens the requested 
AFF file and scans for the affbomn segments. 
For each segment the program then verifies 
the signature on the XML block, then opens 
each AFF segment and verifies that segment’s 
cryptographic hash. (Segment hashes are cached 
after they are computed for efficiency.)
The afverify program can report: 
• Missing segments that were signed but are 
now missing. 
• Extra segments that were not signed but 
have been added to the file. 
• AFF segments whose signature no longer 
verify. 
• AFF segments that were modified at one 
point during the conveyance of evidence. 
These will appear as segments that do not 
verify for older AFFBOMs but to verify 
for later AFFBOMs. In this manner it is 
possible to determine when the segment 
was modified. 
Figure 4 shows afverify applied to the 
file evidence2.aff created in the previous 
section.
aff Parity Pages
To allow for the recovery of data after corruption 
or data loss, AFFLIB 3 introduces the concept 
of AFF Parity Pages. Similar to parity drives 
used in a hard drive storage array, the AFF 
parity page is written for each disk image file 
at the conclusion of disk imaging; each byte 
of the parity page is computed by taking the 
XOR of the corresponding byte of all the other 
disk pages in the AFF file. Thus, the contents 
of any other page can be reconstructed simply 
by taking the XOR of all the remaining pages 
and the parity page.
AFF parity pages work with piecewise 
hashes and digital signatures to provide en-
hanced data recovery. If the hash or digital sig-
nature indicates that a page has been corrupted, 
that page can be erased and then reconstructed 
using all of the other AFF pages and the par-
ity page. Once reconstruction is complete, the 
signature or page hash (which are stored in a 
different location) can be used to determine if 
the reconstruction is correct.
Parity pages are automatically created when 
an image is signed with the afsign utility. They 
can also be created by the aimage disk imaging 
utility, which was previously part of AFFLIB 
but is now its own standalone distribution. 
Because they are the same size as the data 
pages, parity pages are not limited to correcting 
a single error. Indeed, the combination of parity 
pages and per-page hashes and/or signatures 
allows a wide number data corruption events to 
be not only detected but corrected, including:
• One or more bytes changed within a single 
page. 
• One of more bytes changed across mul-
tiple pages, provided that bytes with the 
same offset are not modified on different 
pages. 
Finally, overlapping ranges of bytes on 
multiple pages that are damaged can be recon-
structed using a brute force operation. In these 
cases multiple “trail reconstructions” must be 
attempted, with each reconstructed tested by 
computing the pages’ hash and seeing if the hash 
matches the hash that was previously calculated. 
Essentially, this approach uses a brute force 
search for the correct data: once the correct set 
of bytes is found, the signatures validates. In 
practice such an approach would only work if 
the overlap region in each page is confined to 
4 bytes or less; beyond that, the computational 
overhead is simply too great. If entire sectors 
are corrupt or missing, reconstruction will not 
be successful. (Such a reconstruction is not cur-
rently implemented by the afverify command, 
but may be in a future version.)
signed raw files
AFF’s AFM format allows a disk image to be 
stored in an uncompressed raw file (eg file.
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Filename: evidence2.aff
# Segments signed and Verified:       11
# Segments unsigned:                  0
# Segments with corrupted signatures: 0
SIGNING CERTIFICATE :
   Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 
        CN=Mr. Agent, emailAddress=agent@investiations.com
   Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 
        CN=Mr. Agent, emailAddress=agent@investiations.com
Number of custody chains: 2
---------------------
Signed Bill of Material #1:
SIGNING CERTIFICATE :
   Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 
        CN=Mr. Agent, emailAddress=agent@investiations.com
   Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 




Signed Bill of Material #2:
SIGNING CERTIFICATE :
   Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=State Police, OU=Forensics, 
        CN=Ms. Analyst, emailAddress=analyst@investiations.com
   Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=State Police, OU=Forensics, 
        CN=Ms. Analyst, emailAddress=analyst@investiations.com
Date: 2008-04-26T11:06:21
Notes: 




Figure 4. afverify applied to file evidence2.aff created as part of the AFFLIB test rou-
tines
iso) and the associated metadata to be stored in 
a .afm file. The AFM format can also handle 
raw data stored as a series of split raw files (eg 
file.001, file.002, etc.).
Beacuse AFF tools operate on named seg-
ments that are independent of the underlying 
storage container, the AFM format allows any 
ISO-file to be signed using the afsign com-
mand. The afsign program will automati-
cally detect if it is signing a raw file and will 
create a .afm file to hold the signature. When 
filename.iso is signed, the afsign create a 
new file called filename.afm which contains 
the signatures, the signed bill of materials, and 
other metadata:
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$ ls -l myfile.iso 
-rw-r--r--  1 simsong  simsong  63107908 
Apr 26 11:30 myfile.iso
$ ./afsign -s agent.pem myfile.iso 
Signing segments...
Calculating BOM for page0... 
Calculating BOM for page1... 
Calculating BOM for page2... 
Calculating BOM for page3... 
$ ls -l myfile*
-rw-------  1 simsong  simsong  16785481 
Apr 26 11:30 myfile.afm
-rw-r--r--  1 simsong  simsong  63107908 
Apr 26 11:30 myfile.iso
$ 
Although it is also possible to sign ISO files 
using existing tools such as PGP with detached 
signatures, afsign has several advantages:
• afsign will sign every 16 megabytes 
chunk of the ISO file. In this way, if the 
file is corrupted, it is possible to pinpoint 
what data is invalid and what data is still 
good. 
• Unlike PGP, afsign allows the addition of 
notes and other metadata when a signature 
is written. 
• afsign utilizes X.509 certificates, allow-
ing easy integration into existing PKI-based 
systems.
• Because afsign also computes a parity 
page, it is possible to repair a damaged 
raw file using afrecover (as discussed 
in Section 4.4 ).
Figure 5 illustrates recovery of a corrupted 
file. First the file is corrupted with a block of 
random data. Next the file is checked with 
afverify. Finally the file is recovered using 
afrecover (Figure 5 ).
afflib 3 enCryPtion 
features
AFFLIB 3 introduces the ability to en-
crypt AFF evidence files with the AES-256 
algorithm[NIST, 2001].
Each segment of each AFF file may be 
optionally encrypted with a unique, randomly 
generated 256 bit AES session key. This key 
can then itself be encrypted using a passphrase 
provided by the user or encrypted with an X.509 
public key. Because of this two-step process, 
the passphrase or public key used to encrypt an 
AFF file can be changed in just a few seconds 
without having to decrypt and re-encrypt the 
entire disk image.
Whereas some other forensic programs 
provide the ability to put a “password” on an evi-
dence file, those passwords can be disregarded 
by non-conformant programs. (For example, 
GetData claims that it’s MountImage Pro pro-
gram can “open EnCase password protected 
image files without the password.”[GetData 
Software, 2008] Libewf allows the user to 
ignore the passphrase for EnCase images when 
the images are opened.) AFFLIB 3 uses true 
encryption: if you do not know the correct de-
cryption key, the only way to access the evidence 
is to brute-force the encryption passphrase or 
the X.509 private key.
aff encryption schema
Similar to the design of AFF Signatures, AFF 
Encryption is layered on top of the basic AFF 
functionality that stores name/value pairs. 
Three encryption layers are implement-
ed: 
1. AFF Base Encryption, which provides 
encryption of the AFF segment contents, 
but not the segment names or the segment 
flags. All of the segments in an AFF file 
are encrypted with a the same randomly 
generated affkey. 
2. AFF Passphrase Encryption, a scheme 
for storing the AFF file’s affkey in an AFF 
segment that is itself encrypted with a 
passphrase. 
3. AFF Public Key Encryption, which stores 
the AFF file’s affkey in an AFF segment that 
is encrypted with an X.509 public key. 
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$ dd if=/dev/random of=myfile.iso count=1 skip=1 conv=notrunc
$ afverify myfile.afm
Filename: myfile.afm
# Segments signed and Verified:       13
# Segments unsigned:                  0
# Segments with corrupted signatures: 1
SIGNING CERTIFICATE :
   Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 
            CN=Mr. Agent, emailAddress=agent@investiations.com
   Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 
            CN=Mr. Agent, emailAddress=agent@investiations.com
Bad signature segments:
page0
Number of custody chains: 1
---------------------
Signed Bill of Material #1:
SIGNING CERTIFICATE :
   Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 
            CN=Mr. Agent, emailAddress=agent@investiations.com
   Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Remote, O=Country Govt., OU=Sherif Dept, 




EVIDENCE FILE DOES NOT VERIFY; EVIDENTUARY VALUE MAY BE COMPROMISED.
$ afrecover myfile.afm 
myfile.afm has a bad signature
Attempting to repair page0
Page page0 successfully repaired
$
Figure 5. Demonstration of file corruption and recovery using afrecover
AFF Base Encryption
Encrypted AFF segments are stored in segments 
where name is generated by taking the name 
of the unencrypted segment and appending a 
slash followed by the encryption algorithm and 
keysize. For example, whereas the first 16MB 
of a disk image are typically stored in a seg-
ment named page0, in an encrypted AFF file 
the page is named page0/aes256.
As discussed above, a single AFF session 
key is used to encrypt all of the AFF segments 
in a given file. In AFFLIB 3 this key is randomly 
generated and is not accessible to the user.
Encryption is implemented as modifica-
tions to the af_update_seg and af_get_seg 
functions inside the lib/afflib.cpp source 
file: 
• When a program linked with AFFLIB at-
tempts to store a segment, AFFLIB checks 
to see if an encryption key has been set; if 
one has, the segment’s content is encrypted 
and the segment is stored at the modified 
name (e.g., page0/aes256 instead of 
page0). 
• When a program linked with AFFLIB at-
tempts to fetch a segment and the segment 
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does not exist, AFFLIB checks to see if 
an encryption key is set. If one is, AF-
FLIB attempts to fetch the segment with 
the modified name. If the segment can be 
fetched, AFFLIB attempts to decrypt the 
segment with the key that has been set. If 
decryption is successful the data is returned 
to the caller. 
By implementing encryption at this layer, 
we provide for data to be encrypted after it is 
compressed by the AFFLIB page system. This 
is the preferred approach, as data cannot be 
compressed after it is encrypted.
If a key is set, then pages that are written 
are automatically encrypted, then written to 
the data store.
If an unencrypted page is updated and en-
cryption is enabled, the encrypted page is first 
written, then the unencrypted page is deleted. 
The delete operation involves overwriting the 
unencrypted segment with NULLs inside the 
AFF file. Multiple overwrites are not imple-
mented, as they are not required to preserve data 
privacy on modern hardware[NIST, 2006].
It is an error to change the affkey encryp-
tion key once it has been set.
Encryption Modes and Blocking
Encryption is performed with Cipher Block 
Chaining mode. The initialization vector is the 
name of the sector padded with NULLs. Every 
segment in an AFF file has a different segment 
name, thus a different IV. (IVs do not need to 
be kept secret to ensure privacy; the sole pur-
pose of the IV is to assure that different pages 
with the same data nevertheless have different 
encryptions.)
Block ciphers such as AES require that all 
buffers be padded to the block size; with AES 
the block size is 16 bytes. For performance AFF 
does not add padding if the page is already a 
multiple of the block size. If the size of the 
vector is not a multiple of the AES block size, 
two values are computed:
extra = len(modblocksize) (1)
pad = 16extra (2)
The buffer is padded by pad bytes; the 
buffer is now a multiple of the AES block 
size. The buffer is encrypted. Finally, extra 
pad bytes are appended. Although the buffer 
is expanded, it is now possible to recover the 
original length of the buffer when the segment 
is read and decrypted.
To decrypt the buffer and recover the 
original length, the values extra and pad are 
computed once again. The extra pad bytes are 
removed, the buffer is decrypted, and last pad 
bytes are removed. The length of the resulting 
buffer is set to be the length of the encrypted 
buffer minus the AES block size, and the de-
crypted data buffer is returned. In this way, the 
length does not need to be explicitly coded. 
This scheme is the same as the one employed 
by PKCS #7 ([Laboratories, 1993]; in keeping 
with PKCS #7, the pad byte is hex 01 if one 
pad byte is required, hex 02 02 if two bytes 
are required, and so on.
The integrity of decrypted page data can be 
checked by comparing the MD5 of the decrypted 
pagen/aes256 segment with the decrypted 
contents of the pagen_md5/aes256 segment 
using the afverify command, or by verifying 
the AFF signatures if they are present. 
Design Limitations
There are a number of limitations that arise from 
the way that AFFLIB 3 implements encryp-
tion. In this section we will briefly discuss the 
limitations and explain why we think they are 
inconsequential:
• AFF Encryption only encrypts the byt-
estream of segments; the segment name 
and 32-bit flag are unencrypted.
AFF encryption is created for the specific 
purpose of encrypting data and metadata that 
are acquired from disk images. For this rea-
son, we concluded that there was no reason 
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to attempt to obscure the segment names or 
32-bit flags with cryptography, because these 
do not hold information that needs to be kept 
confidential.
• A single AFF file may contain informa-
tion that is both encrypted and not 
encrypted.
Because encryption is performed on a per-
segment basis, it is possible to have segments 
that are both encrypted and unencrypted. We 
see this ability as an advantage, as it allows 
files that are unencrypted to be encrypted in 
place without the need to allocate double the 
disk space. Should the encryption process be 
interrupted (for example, by a power failure), 
the process can continue where it left off at 
some later point.
• The affkey cannot be changed once it is 
set for a specific file.
We believe that the added complexity to 
support multiple affkeys within a single file 
would not be worth the complexity. In part 
this is because the key is not intended to be 
used by the user: it is really just a session key 
that is used by the passphrase or the public 
key encryption system. Should the affkey be 
compromised, every segment would need to be 
reencrypted. The easiest way to do this would 
be to copy one encrypted AFF file to another 
file using the afcopy command.
aff Passphrase encryption
Most investigators would prefer to work with a 
simple passphrase than with a 256-bit encryption 
key that needs to be specially maintained, so 
AFFLIB 3 provides this ability as well.
AFF Passphrase Encryption builds upon the 
Base Encryption. When a passphrase is entered 
AFFLIB uses the SHA256 algorithm to change 
the passphrase into a 256-bit hash. But instead of 
using this has as an encryption key directly, the 
hash is used to encrypt the randomly generated 
affkey. The encrypted session key is then stored 
in the affkey-aes256 segment.
This scheme could easily be modified to 
support multiple passphrases on each file, storing 
them in segments such as affkey-aes256_0, 
affkey-aes256_1, etc., although there have 
been no requests for such functionality.
The contents of the affkey_aes256 seg-
ment is a 68 byte structure:
bytes purpose
0–3 The version number, stored in net-work byte order.
4–67
The affkey, encrypted with AES in 
Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode 
using SHA-256 of the passphrase as 
the encryption key.
68–131 The SHA-256 of the affkey (for 
verification purposes).
 
With this scheme the passphrase can be 
changed without requiring the entire disk im-
age to be re-encrypted—all that needs to be 
done is that the affkey-aes256 segment is 
read, decrypted using the old passphrase, and 
and re-encrypted with the new passphrase. (If 
a disk image does need to be re-encryped—for 
example, if the affkey is compromised—this 
can be easily done by copying the file with 
the afcopy command from one AFF file to 
another.)
A further advantage of this scheme is that 
the passphrase is not cached in memory. 
aff Public key encryption
AFF’s public key encryption facilities allow a 
disk image to be encrypted when it is created 
with a public key; to use the disk image at a 
later time requires the corresponding private 
key. This might be useful if an image is to be 
acquired in the field: once the image is acquired, 
it would be cryptographically protected so that 
it could not be deciphered even if the machine 
(or person) doing the encryption was later 
intercepted. 
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In practice, the disk image’s public key is 
specified when the file is created. At this point 
a random affkey is created, encrypted with the 
public key, and cached in memory. As long as the 
file remains open it can be read and written. But 
when the file is closed the in-memory copy of 
the affkey is erased. Thus, once the file is closed, 
access to the data for either reading or writing 
requires the corresponding private key.
Public key encryption is implemented by 
taking the affkey and encrypting it using the 
OpenSSL “envelope” provisions. This involves 
creating a random session key and initialization 
vector, encrypting the affkey with the session 
key using a block cipher, and then encrypting 
the session key with the public key that will be 
used for sealing. The resulting encrypted session 
key, encrypted affkey, and initialization vector 
are all stored it in a segment called affkey-
evpn where n starts at 0 and increases. Padding 
is according to PKCS #1[Laboratories, 2002]. In 
this manner the same affkey is never encrypted 
twice with two different RSA public keys.
For encrypting, the public key used for 
sealing can be specified in one of two ways:
 
• In a file whose name is provided on the 
command line, using the “-C” option (“C” 
for Certificate). 
• The filename referenced by the environ-
ment variable AFFLIB_ENCRYPTING_PUB-
LIC_KEYFILE 
For decrypting, the private key used for un-
sealing can be specified in one of two ways: 
• In a file whose name is provided on the 
command line, using the “-K” option (“K” 
for Key). 
• The environment variable AFFLIB_DE-
CRYPTING_PRIVATE_KEY. 
Although AFFLIB does not currently 
support the entering of a passphrase to decrypt 
private keys that protected with a passphrase or 
for using a smart card or cryptographic token, 
these capabilities can be added to a future re-
lease if requested by users. OpenSSL already 
has support for these capabilities; all that is 
required is passing this capability through to 
the AFFLIB API). 
integrating encryption with 
existing tools
Specifying a Passphrase as Part of a 
Filename
AFFLIB understands Uniform Resource 
Identifier[Berners-Lee et  al., 2005] (URI) 
syntax, and URIs have provisions for specifying 
passwords. Thus, it is relatively straightforward 
to integrate passphrase-protected AFF files 
with existing command-line forensic tools by 
simply specifying the passphrase as part of 
the filename.
URIs such as http://www.afflib.org/
download/afflib.tar.gz consists of scheme 
(e.g., http), an authority (www.afflib.org), 
a path (download/afflib.tar.gz), a query 
and a fragment (not shown here). Although the 
authority is typically just a hostname, the full 
syntax for the authority is:
authority = [ userinfo “@” ] host [ 
“:” port]
Userinfo was traditionally represented as 
username:password. Although this syntax is 
deprecated in the current version of RFC3986, 
to avoid for the possible leakage of confidential 
information, we have chosen to use it to provide 
forensic workers with an easy means of specify-
ing passwords on the command line.
A file can be encrypted using AFF afcopy 
command like this:
$ afcopy myfile.iso file://:password@/
myfile.aff
The resulting file can only be accessed 
if the passphrase is used: 
$ afcat myfile.aff\verb|wc
afcat: This file has 5 encrypted seg-
ments.
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afcat: No unencrypted pages could be 
found.
       0       0       0
$ afcat file://:password@/myfile.aff 
| wc
 5481881 5980668 63107908
5.4.2  Specifying a passphrase in an 
environment variable
As an alternative to specifying the 
passphrase on the command line, 
AFFLIB 3 allows passphrases to be 
specified in the AFFLIB_PASSPHRASE 
environment variable:
$ export AFFLIB_PASSPHRASE=password
$ afcat myfile.aff | wc
 5481881 5980668 63107908
$
Using Encryption with affuse
Finally, an encrypted image can be mounted 
using affuse; the decryption is done in the 
user-level affuse program, so that operating 
system (and application program) are able to 
directly process unencrypted, uncompressed 
data:
# affuse file://:password@/myfile.aff 
mnt
# ls -l mnt
total 0
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 67108864 Dec 
31  1969 myfile.aff.raw
Notice that this command must be executed 
as root. Also note that modification time of the 








Sets the affkey that will be used for the currently 
open AFF file. Returns an error if the key is 
already set.
af_cannot_decrypt
Returns true if there are encrypted pages present 
that cannot be decrypted with the currently speci-
fied affkey.
af_has_encrypted_segments Returns true if the currently open AFF file has encrypted segments.




If no key has been set, creates a random affkey, 
encrypts the key with the passphrase and stores 
the segment in the AFF file. Returns an error if a 
key has already been set.
af_change_aes_passphrase
Changes the passphrase for an AFF file from old-
phrase to newphrase. Returns an error if oldphrase 
is not the correct phrase.
af_use_aes_passphrase
Tests to see if passphrase is in fact the correct 
passphrase for the currently opened AFF file. If it 
is, the passphrase will be used. An error is returned 
otherwise.
Table 3.
continued on following page
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ConClusion
This article introduces the provisions for crypto-
graphic security, integrity, and chain-of-custody 
that have been incorporated in Version 3 of the 
Advance Forensic Format Library (AFFLIB). 
These provisions build upon the AFF format 
introduced by Garfinkel et. al in 2006[Garfin-
kel et  al., 2006], allowing transparent access 
to evidence files that are digital signed or 
encrypted.
Compared with other approaches and 
alternatives, AFF Signatures and Encryption 
offers the following advantages:
• The scheme was simple to implement and 
test. 
• AFFLIB offers real encryption of eviden-
tiary data, not a simple “password” as is 
present in other systems. 
• Raw files can be signed without the need 
to modify the original data. 
• Unencrypted evidence files can be en-
crypted in-place. 
Because of design decisions, AFFLIB 
encryption does have a few disadvantages. 
Specifically: 
• Segment names and the 32-bit argument 
stored with AFF segments are digitally 
signed but they are not encrypted. Since 
segment names and the 32-bit argument 
never hold evidentiary data or metadata, 
this lack of encryption is not considered 
to be significant. 
• Each AFF file is encrypted with its own 
key; the only way to change the key is to 
copy the data from one encrypted file to 
another. However, the passphrase used to 
encrypt a file can be changed instantly. 
• AFFLIB caches the encryption key in 
memory in the AF structure, allowing the 
key to be stolen by hostile software. This 
shortcoming can overcome through the 
use of trusted operating systems or cryp-
tographic tokens. 
future Work
We continue to make improvements in AFF 
and aimage. More information about AFF, 
including the source code for AFFLIB 3, can 
be found at http://www.afflib.org/.
AFF Public Key Signatures
af_set_sign_files
Opens the files containing a private key and certifi-
cate. The cryptographic information they contain 
are thereafter used to sign all segments that are 
updated.
af_sign_seg Asks AFF to sign a specified segment.
af_sign_all_unsigned_seg-
ments Asks AFF to sign all of the unsigned segments.
af_is_signed_segment Returns TRUE if there is a signature segment for the segment segname.
AFF Public Key Encryption(Sealing)
af_set_seal_certificates
Creates an affkey, encrypts the key with each of 
the provided X.509 certificates, and stores each 
encrypted affkey in its own segment
af_set_unseal_keybuffer
Specifies a string buffer containing an unencrypted 
RSA key in PEM format.
Table 3. continued
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endnotes
1 This article is released by the Naval Postgraduate 
School, an agency of the U.S. Department of De-
fense. Please note that within the United States, 
copyright protection, under Section 105 of the 
United States Code, Title 17, is not available 
for any work of the United States Government 
and/or for any works created by United States 
Government employees. You acknowledge that 
this article contains work which was created by 
an NPS employee and is therefore in the public 
domain and not subject to copyright. You may 
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use, distribute, or incorporate this article pro-
vided that you acknowledges this via an explicit 
acknowledgment of NPS-related contributions 
to your publication. You also agree to acknowl-
edge, via an explicit acknowledgment, that any 
modifications or alterations have been made to 
this article before redistribution.
2 A comprehensive list of disk imagers can be 
found on the Forensics Wiki at http://www.
forensicswiki.org/index.php?title=Category:
Disk_imaging.
3 Assuming that the signature algorithm itself 
has not been compromised, of course
4 Five NULL bytes are used so that the data 
offset for the hash calculation is the same with 
Signature Mode 1 as it is for Signature Mode 
0, which simplifies the implementation.
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